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Abstract:  
This paper revisits Bairoch’s hypothesis that in the late 19th 
century tariffs were positively associated with growth, as recently 
confirmed by a new generation of quantitative studies (see 
O`Rourke (2000), Jacks (2006) and Clemens-Williamson (2002, 
2004)). This paper highlights the importance of the structure of 
protection in the relation between trade policy and its potential 
growth-promoting impact. Evidence is based on a new database 
on industrial tariffs for the 1870`s. The results show that income, 
factor endowment, and policy independence are important to 
explain regional asymmetries between tariffs and growth. At global 
level, increased protection, measured by total and average tariffs 
on manufactures, implied more un-skilled inefficient protection and 
less growth, and this is especially true for the poor countries in the 
late 19th century.  Protection was only positive for a “rich club” if 
we include in this group New Settler countries which grew rapidly 
in the late 19th century and imposed high tariffs mainly for fiscal 
reasons.  
 
 
1. Introduction 
In the explanation of economic growth, any attempt to isolate one 
single factor among the complex mix is a hard task, and this certainly 
applies to the economic impact of commercial policies too. Many 
economic historians have supported the idea that during the late 19th 
century protection was instrumental to the development of continental 
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 Europe. Bairoch’s (1972, 1976, 1989, 1993) hypothesis that tariffs were 
positively associated with growth mainly applied to European countries, 
but it has also been extended to other high-tariff land-abundant countries 
like the rich European offshoots1.  
Recent econometric studies carried out by O´Rourke (2000) and 
Jacks (2006) tend to confirms propositions regarding the positive 
correlation between tariffs and growth in the late 19th century.2 Both 
works use a limited sample of 10 countries, mostly rich European or
abundant countries with good institutions, and this fact has been 
criticized, even if they are more concerned in exploring the variation in the 
time series of economic growth than in analyzing cross section influence.  
Other studies that follow a similar time series strategy point out that the 
relationship between average tariffs and growth (significant or not 
significant, positive or negative) depends crucially on the countries 
included in the sample. A larger sample of countries has shown that 
correlation between tariff average and growth might vary considerably in 
different countries, according to different levels of wealth and degrees of 
political independence (see Williamson 2006b).
 land-
                                                
3 Likewise, Irwin (2002b) 
shows that rich land-abundant countries may be outliers in the relation 
between tariffs and growth, because often relied on customs duties to 
generate a large proportion of their government revenue: they tended to 
 
1  This positive relation between tariffs and growth in Europe in the late 19th century 
has been sustained  by many authors, including  Milward –Saul (1977),  Pollard (1982)  
but  notably Bairoch (1972, 1976, 1989, 1996). For an extended discussion on the 
good reputation of  late 19th century protectionism,  see Tena (2005).  
2 Even if O´Rourke  diverges in many points from Bairoch, it is generally agreed that in 
the late 19th century tariff and growth were positively associated: “It appears that 
Bairoch hypothesis (that tariffs were positively associated with growth in the late 19th 
century)  holds remarkably well, when tested with recently available data, and when 
controlling for other factors influencing growth.” O`Rourke (2000), p. 473.  
3 O´Rourke (2000) p. 478,  remembers that: “Lessons from the late 19th century core 
cannot automatically be extended to the late 19th century periphery: as always more 
research on Southern and Eastern Europe, as well as the developing world , should be 
high on the agenda of cliometricians”.  For the 20th century see Dejong and Ripoll, 
2006; and for both 19th and 20th century Clemens and Williamson  (2001, 2004) and 
Vamvakidis (2002). 
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 impose high tariffs, but without following an import substituting extrategy.  
And Tena (2005, 2006) remarks that rich European tariff average is often 
distorted by revenue tariffs not designed to protect domestic producers, 
and that we should focus on the relation between manufacture tariffs and 
growth.  
The most notable feature of this historical literature is its reliance on 
economy-wide average measures of protection.  On one side, these data 
are readily available for a wide variety of countries, and average tariffs 
are easily calculated: all one needs to do is to divide total customs 
revenue, by the total value of imports. On the other side, the simplicity of 
tariffs average makes it impossible to reach a deeper understanding of 
the causal mechanism linking tariffs and growth. In fact, as De Long 
(1995) and Irwin (2001a) emphasised for the late 19th century,  the 
central question to investigate here is how tariffs alter domestic relative 
prices in order to shift resource allocation between higher and lower 
productivity sectors. In this case the emphasis will be put on the dynamics 
of economies of scale, learning-by-doing, and technical innovation that 
various sectors can develop as a consequence of temporal protection.  
In a very recent paper Lehman-O´Rourke (2008), asking whether 
agricultural and industrial tariffs had the same impact on growth in the late 
19th century, found robust results that manufacture, rather than 
agricultural tariffs, were related with growth. Their paper uses panel data, 
but limits the analysis to the same “rich countries club” than O´Rourke 
(2000). Also, it focuses on five-year periods, picking up the short to 
medium run impact of protection rather than the longer-run effects (p.14).  
This paper addresses the same issue but differs from the earlier 
literature in two respects. Firstly, we focus on the relation between 
efficient or inefficient tariff structures and long-run growth; secondly we 
pay special attention to the different levels and geographical diversity of 
tariffs structure around the world. This approach is made possible 
 3
 because we use a new and improved database which expands the 
number of countries, and offers a much more detailed desagregation of 
manufacture tariffs ranked according their skill intensity.  
The paper is structured as follows. The next section provides a 
general view of the relevance of the issue of regional asymmetry in the 
tariff-growth debate. Section 3 presents the intuitive model which relates 
tariff structure and growth, based on total tariff average, industrial tariffs 
average, and the skill industrial tariff bias. Section 4 describes the 
sources and the variables used in the new data base used in this study.  
Section 5 discusses the main results of the correlation model, while the 
last section looks at how, in general, these results match the model 
predictions that countries with relatively higher tariffs in industry grow 
more slowly, apparently because high tariff countries protected the non-
skill intensive sectors more than skill intensive ones. The last section 
provides some concluding remarks, including the relevance of these 
findings in rejecting some of the interpretations offered by the previous 
literature. 
 
 
2.  Did Tariff Structure Explain Regional Asymmetries in the 
Tariff-Growth Relation? 
The starting point is the confirmation and discussion of the 
regionally asymmetrical relationships between tariff average and growth 
discovered by Williamson et al. The tariff-growth relationship may be 
ambiguous because high tariffs in sectors with positive externalities may 
induce high rates of growth, while high tariffs in sectors with no positive 
externalities may induce low rates of growth. So, in theory, there is no 
reason to find a systematically unambiguous relationship between 
average tariffs and growth in different groups of countries, and regional 
asymmetry may be partially explained by different tariff structures.   
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 This paper assumes that in the late 19th century the regional 
asymmetries were mainly influenced by the starting level of income per 
capita, relative factor abundance, and political independence. The 
division between rich and poor countries is a general proxy for different 
economic structures, and institutional factors that may determine, both 
the tariff structure bias and the relationship between tariffs and growth. 
Rich nations in Europe, with good institutions, were able to develop tariff 
policies which was less dependent on pressure groups. That would imply 
moderate and efficient tariffs on manufactured products4. The tariff 
policies of politically-independent poor countries, with less transparent 
institutions, weak enforcement of political rights, and lower parliament and 
executive independence, instead, was more likely to be influenced by 
lobbies. The result would be a policy of relatively higher, but more 
inefficient tariffs in industry (biased in favour of non-competitive industrial 
sectors without pro-growth effects). Land-abundant new settlers tended to 
impose high tariffs for reasons involving public finance and political 
economy5. In terms of public finance, the taxation of imports goods 
reduced the cost of tax compliance in relation with other alternatives, and 
this is especially true for countries with low population density. Other 
means of raising revenue (excise taxes, land taxes, income taxes and the 
like) simply may not have been as feasible or as easy to enforce in 
countries with a widely dispersed population, particularly in the late 
nineteenth century. In terms of political economy, if the majority of the 
                                                 
4  Core European countries had moderate manufacture tariffs and high revenue tariffs 
levied on just a few key primary commodities (such as alcoholic beverages, coffee and 
tea, sugar  and tobacco). Revenue tariffs may have some protective effects but affect 
differently growth than broadly based tariffs designed to protect domestic producers 
(Tena 2006). 
5 This argument is developed by Irwin (2002 b).  In Figure 3 and 4 (of that paper),  Irwin 
shows  the existence of a clear positive association between  land abundance (ratio of 
productive land over population)  either  with trade tax dependence (ratio of costume 
revenue over total revenue) or  with total tariff average.  This evidence supports the 
idea that in these cases, high tariffs  were nor based upon an import substitution 
strategy.   
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 population owns land (or if the government is controlled by landowners), 
they may have the interest and the opportunity to avoid direct taxes on 
land in favour of high taxes on high revenue-generating imported 
products or manufactured luxury goods.6 
 The picture was very different in the European colonies in Africa 
and Asia that implemented typical free trade policies, normally imposed 
by their metropolis.  Many of these countries which had created much 
closed economies in mid-19th century, became pro global-low tariffs 
countries at the end of the century.7 Even independent countries such as 
Japan or China, under British influence, adopted in the second half of 19th 
century treaties which limited their tariffs to 5 per cent. Similarly, other 
Asian countries, such as for instance India and Indonesia, were forced by 
their colonial masters to adopt liberal trade policies. Also in Africa, even if 
French, Portuguese and Italians colonies typically discriminated in favour 
of their respective colonial power, the progressive extension of European 
control resulted, in general terms, in a further diffusion of liberal trade 
policies at the end of the 19th century.8  This partial exogenous 
determination of their commercial policy would reduce the influence of 
local pressure groups, which in theory would press for higher tariffs, and 
                                                 
6 See Irwin (2002.b) and Bértola-Williamson (2006). 
7 Following Bairoch (1989) : countries like Abyssinia, Afghanistan, China, Iran, Japan, 
Liberia, Siam, Arab Peninsula, Iran, Japan, Siam and Turkey (Ottoman Empire) were 
not formal colonies at the end of the 19th century shared one important characteristic: 
“European Powers” obliged them, directly or indirectly, to open up their national 
markets” (p. 155). 
8  See Findlay –O´Rourke (2007, p.401), “Countries like Japan  gradually increase their  
tariff beginning in1889, but tariffs remained low prior to 1911, when the first 
autonomous (and protectionist) tariff  was introduced (see Bairoch 1989, p.157)”.   
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 would lead to a more neutral incidence of tariffs on the assignment of 
resources.9 
 Consequently, the question of whether a significant relationship 
between initial tariff average and growth exists, and whether this 
relationship is positive or negative, depends critically on the countries 
included in the sample.  
In order to assess regional degrees of protection and their relation 
with growth we first provide a graphical analysis of the correlation 
between the initial degree of protection and the subsequent rate of 
growth. The initial tariff average used here, and in previous works, is 
measured as customs revenues divided by the total value of imports for 
the years 1865-1875; accumulated GDP per capita growth for 1870-1913, 
as usual, is in real terms 1990 international Geary-Khakis dollars provided 
by Maddison (2001). The world has been divided between rich and poor 
according to arbitrary but explicit criteria: those countries which, in 1870, 
had a Maddison GDP per capita below half of that of the richest country in 
the world (the United Kingdom) are classified as “poor”. Besides, taking 
into account what has been said above, a subdivision has been 
introduced for the rich, separating land-abundant countries from the rest 
(according to the established literature). At the same time, poor countries 
have been divided according to their tariff policy independence (in line 
with Williamson (2006) and Bairoch (1976, 1989)). As a consequence, 
this paper analyses forty one countries divided in four geographical 
regions (See Table 2 Appendix): eight Rich European countries 
(DumReg1: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France; Germany, the 
                                                 
9 Other authors, including Bairoch (1989), and, more recently, Williamson (2006b), 
Findlay and O’Rourke (2007), mentioned the importance of  free colonial trade policy in 
the process of deindustrializing the colonies. But this debate is still open: “these trade 
laws led first to the disappearance of existing crafts and later curbed the process of 
reindustrialization” (Bairoch (1989), p. 127). Global terms of trade forces produced 
rising primary product specialization and de-industrialization in colonial countries at the 
end of the 19th century (See Lewis (1989) and Williamson  (2006b). 
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 Netherlands, Switzerland and the United Kingdom); six Rich New Settlers 
(DumReg2: Argentina, Australia, Canada, New Zealand, Uruguay and the 
USA); fourteen Poor Political Independent countries from the European 
Periphery and Latin America (DumReg3: Greece, Hungary, Italy, Norway, 
Portugal, Romania, Russia, Spain, Sweden, Brazil, Cuba, Peru and 
Colombia), and thirteen Poor Political Dependent, most of then African an 
Asian colonies and protectorates  (DumReg4: Burma, Ceylon, China, 
Egypt, India, Indonesia, Japan, Morocco, Tunisia Philippines, South 
Africa, Thailand and  Turkey). As Table 2 in the Appendix shows, we do 
not have a complete dataset for all countries listed: therefore, for some 
regressions the number of observations varies from a minimum of 28 to a 
maximum of 37.10   
                                                
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
10Exceptions to the regional criterium adopted are Argentina has been included in the 
group of rich new settlers (despite its GDPpc in 1870 is slightly below half UK GDPpc 
in the same year, according to Maddison (2003). This is due to the fact that Argentina 
is generally considered as a rich new settler that shares similar characteristics as an 
expansionist economy with strong imports of labour and capital and trade tax 
dependence. See O’Rourke -Williamson (1999), Irwin (2002 b). 
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 Figure 1 
 
Sources: Initial Tariff (75NT) and GDP Growth (7013GDPGR) in Table 2, Appendix 2.  
 
Figure 2 
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Sources: Initial Tariff (75NT) and GDP Growth (7013GDPGR) in Table 2, Appendix 2.  
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 Figure 3 
Sources: Initial Tariff (75NT) and GDP Growth (7013GDPGR) in Table 2, Appendix 2.  
 
To emphasize the regional asymmetry of the tariff-growth 
association, we first provide Figures 1 and 2, which confirm the positive 
association between the initial tariff average in 1865-1875 and real GDP 
per capita growth between 1870-1913, for the same group of countries 
used by O`Rourke (2000) and Jacks (2006) respectively. O`Rourke uses 
Australia, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, Norway, Sweden,  
the United Kingdom and the United States, whereas Jack uses: Austria-
Hungary, Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Norway, Russia, Spain, the 
United Kingdom and the United States. It is important to take into account 
that most of the countries included in the sample are rich European and 
land-abundant countries. The selection of the country sample apparently 
is arbitrary and solely determined by the availability of historical data. In 
fact, it has been criticised by several authors (see Irwin (2002a,b), 
Williamson (2006b) and Tena (2006)). The strong bias towards rich 
countries typical of the previous literature is confirmed by using an 
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 alternative sample explicitly containg only rich countries (New Settlers 
and European countries) as showed in Figure 3. In both cases the 
regression is strongly influenced by the tariff-growth data of the USA. 
 
Figure 4 
Sources: 75NT and 7013GDPGR in Table 2, Appendix 2. 
 
 
As Figure 4 shows, however, once the whole sample of 38 world 
countries is considered, no positive or negative association between 
tariffs and growth emerges. A better representation of the world including 
rich and poor with colonies and independent developing countries thus 
provides a different picture of the tariff-growth relationship. Following 
Williamson et al. (2001, 2004, 2006), the strategy of this paper is to 
accept the existence of regional asymmetry, and propose an organization 
of world countries in clubs following the criteria mentioned above. Thus, 
the poor are divided according to their political independence, or, in other 
words, their capacity to develop an independent commercial policy from 
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 the metropolis. This may be an important issue for most Asian and 
African countries with the status of colonies or protectorates in the late 
19th century11. 
    Figure 5 
 
Sources: Initial Tariff (75NT) and GDP Growth (7013GDPGR) in Table 2, Appendix 2.  
 
Figure 5 shows a stronger positive association between tariffs and 
growth for poor non-independent countries. These Asian and African 
countries had a low tariff average level (between 3 and 8 per cent) 
because their tariff policies enjoyed very limited independence from the 
core European metropolis. This exogenous determination of their 
commercial policy made it possible to control local pressure groups that 
                                                 
11 There is no doubt that for late 19th century political autonomy and independence 
needs to be more accurately defined. By instance Commonwealth countries  as 
Canada, Australia, New Zealand  had not exactly plain  independent commercial policy 
from the metropolis but  they developed an autonomous commercial policy for most of 
the period. Here we follow Williamson et al (2001, 2006a).  
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 wanted higher tariffs and led to a more neutral incidence of tariffs on the 
assignment of resources.12  
Figure 6 
Sources: Initial Tariff (75NT) and GDP Growth (7013GDPGR) in Table 2, Appendix 2.  
 
On the contrary, Figure 6 shows that for peripheral independent 
countries the relationship between tariff average and growth appears 
consistently negative. Politically independent poor countries had 
commercial policies designed by their own governments and parliaments. 
The European periphery and Latin America had high tariffs, especially for 
traditional industrial products without comparative advantage, even if 
some of then linked with technologies developed from the First Industrial 
Revolution.  From the second half of the 19th century many poor 
independent countries developed some low-skill manufactures, as 
traditional textile and metal, imposing high tariffs especially in non-
competitive sectors. Even if they reduced some manufacture tariffs, 
                                                 
12 For a similar approximation for the African and Asian colonies see Williamson 
(2006a) and Bairoch (1989, 1996). 
 13
 during the liberalization period around the 1850’s and 1860’s, at the 
beginning of 1870’s they still had a level of manufacture protection that 
was more than three fold that of the European rich countries. During this 
period they developed well-established and organized lobbies which 
demanded high tariffs to defend national industry from the competition of 
rich countries manufactured exports. When protection get back to fashion 
in 1880s and 1890s peripheral governments were too weak to stop rent-
seeking in the economy and most of them increased manufacture tariffs 
in non-competitive sectors. These results could reflect both the existence 
of poor underlying institutions, and a negative association between 
protected industrial sectors and long-run growth.13  
 
 
3.  The Causal Mechanism Between Tariffs and Growth. Tariff 
Structure and Institutions. 
In order for tariffs to have a positive effect on growth it is necessary 
that over time protected manufacture sectors increase productivity more 
rapidly than less protected sectors because productivity growth should 
overcome the accumulated protection welfare losses. As Rodriguez–
Rodrik (2000, p.264) highlights:  “Such models are in fact formalizations 
of some very old arguments about infant industries and about the need 
for temporary protection to catch up with more advanced countries”.  In 
this case the emphasis is on the dynamics of economies of scale, 
learning-by-doing, and technical innovation that protected sectors can 
develop as a consequence of temporal protection. However it is 
questionable to assume that, without further qualifications, late 19th 
                                                 
13 The average of the unweighted manufacture tariff  for Rich Europe and Poor 
Indepent countries in 1875 was 7, 6 and 24, 4, respectively. See Appendix Table 2. For 
an extensive discussion on Latin America protectionism see Coatsworth-Williamson 
(2004) and Bertola –Williamson (2006). For the European periphery see Federico-Tena 
(1998, 1999) and Tena  (1999, 2006). 
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 century manufacturing as a undifferentiated sector responded to the 
criteria above. In this sense, a more reasonable assumption that we can 
make is that a country which focuses protection on highly-skilled 
manufacturing industries will probably have higher rates of growth than if 
protection were focused on low-skilled manufacturing sectors.  
  This opens the question of how decisions about protecting low or 
high-skilled sectors were taken. The literature on endogenous protection 
has long recognized that a country’s tariffs are an outcome of a political 
rent-seeking game mainly determined by the type of institutions 
developed in the country (Krueger (1974, 1999), Magee,-Brock and 
Young (1989), Trefler (1993), Grossman and Helpman (1991, 1994) and 
Magee (2002)).  In fact, we can observe that countries or governments 
fall prey to “rent seekers” and usually protect sectors because they are 
more interested in barring foreign competitors than promoting growth.  
In a very recent paper Nunn and Trefler (2006), following 
Grossman and Helpman’s (1994) protection-for-sale model, develop a 
new approach to examine the causal mechanism between tariffs and 
long-term growth for the late 20th century, introducing externalities into the 
model.14 In the new model, tariffs affect future growth via externalities and 
these externalities vary across industries. High tariffs reduce welfare, and 
probably growth, if they are not distributed in favour of industries which 
generate positive externalities at an economy-wide level.  Nunn and 
Trefler contribution links to the previous literature on the institutions-
protection dynamic, by suggesting that only countries with developed 
institutions, able to put a lid on lobbying, will favour tariffs in skill-intensive 
industries against non-skill intensive industries.  So, this model assumes 
                                                 
14 For the positive externalities of some sectors on general productivity see Antweiler- 
Trefler (2002), Irwin (1994).  
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 that good institutions encourage politicians to be closer to pro-growth 
policies. 15 
Following Nunn and Trefler, this paper adopts the hypothesis that a 
country with “good” institutions will provide higher tariffs in industries that 
generate positive externalities. These externalities would have to operate 
at an economy-wide level, coming either from either general economic 
and/or technological sources, rather than from manufacturing alone.  
Following the tradition of the tariff-growth literature, and especially 
Nunn-Trefler (2006), equation (1) expresses the dependent relationship 
between the annual average rate of growth of GDP per capita and, as 
explanatory variables, tariff average, manufacture tariffs, tariff structure, 
and the quality of institutions:  
 
lnYC1 /YC0  =   β0YC0  + βЕ Еτc0  +  βSB SBv τc0  + Хc0 βX  + RegDum +  εc      (1) 
 
In this equation we consider only long term growth so we take t = 0 
to be the initial year (1870) and t = 1, the final year (1913).  
The dependent variable is  lnYC1 /YC0   (measured as the 
accumulated real GDP per capita growth rate).  β0YC0   refers  the initial 
GDP per capita in 1870 used as the classical variable of control for 
convergence in this type of exercise. Еτc0  is the tariff total or manufacture 
average (we will use both) in country c and  initial year 0 (1875). Let SBv 
τc0  be the tariff structure showed by the skill-bias of tariffs in country c in 
initial year 0 (1875), and Хc0 βX  as country-specific variables related with 
the quality of institutions. We also introduce regional dummies as regional 
fixed effect related with the level of development, land abundance or 
political independence, with only two values 0 and 1. 
                                                 
15 There are many Olsonian  “collective action” arguments and national case studies to 
support this argument (see Irwin (1994) and Magee –Brock-Young (1989), Federico -
Tena (1999) and Tena (2005).  
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 In the case of the initial tariff average ( Еτc0 ) we will use the 
weighted total tariff average “75NT” and the unweighted tariff average for 
manufacture“75UNTMAN” as presented   in Table 2 in the Appendix.  For 
the initial tariff structure ( SBv τc0 ) we will use the initial manufacture skill 
bias constructed following Nunn and Trefler’s (2006) procedures. The first 
proxy used is presented as “75Corr-Skill”, and defined as the cross-
industry correlation between skill intensity ranking estimated for 1875, 
showed in Table 1, and the respective ranking of ad valorem tariffs of the 
same sectors. Most of the countries in our sample have a negative 
correlation sign between the skill and tariff ranking showing in general 
that tariffs are usually higher in no skill-intensive industries and lower in 
skill-intensive industries ( see correlation in Table 3 Appendix ).  The 
second proxy used is “75Diff-Skill” that is constructed choosing an 
arbitrary “cut-off” in the ranking of skill-intensive industries and calculated 
as the simple difference between the  unweighted tariff average of the  
sectors situated in the “up cut-off” and those of the “down cut off” for 
every country. This cut-off has been chosen in relation with the largest 
differences in the skill intensity sectors around the mid point of the 
ranking (see Table 1 below).   For the institutional variables, two types of 
index have been used: one that relates the level of democracy of a 
country   POLITY2  (numeric), range = -10 to 10 (-10 = high autocracy; 10 
= high democracy) ;  and another which measures the grade of 
independence of the executive government, XCONST (numeric).  The 
last institutional variable would be used as proxy variable of good 
institutions in relation with the independence of the government from 
pressure groups.  
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 4. New Data on Industrial Tariffs, Skill-Bias and Institutions 
 With the exception of Bairoch (1989), there are no comparative 
studies of industrial tariff levels of the 1870s by country.  Bairoch (1989) 
includes a table of comparative industrial tariff averages in 1875 for 14 
countries (“Author’s computation based on tariff duties and prices for 14 
different manufactured products” p.42). But he does not offer information 
on the manufactured items included, or the method used (tariffs, prices 
and weights). A more accurate attempt of estimation of manufacture 
tariffs by country was developed very recently in Lehman-O´Rourke 
(2008). This work offers a time series estimation for the years 1875-1913 
of weighted agricultural, manufacturing, and “exotics tariffs for the same 
10 countries sample used in O´Rourke (2000). The procedure is dividing 
customs revenues by total imports in 16 identical commodity categories 
for every country and classified as belonging to either.16 
 The estimation presented here has been devised adopting the 
following procedure (for details of the estimation of the industrial tariff 
data base see Appendix). In the first place, British sources offered the ad-
valorem tariffs of 26 industrial products in 1875 for 32 countries; secondly, 
those 26 industrial products have been assembled in 16 industrial sectors 
for which it has been estimated their relative skill intensity, based on the 
general structure of USA industrial wages in 1890 (using secondary 
sources) and other sources of textile wages in 1885 in Spain (from the 
USA Consular Reports).  
The ad valorem tariff sources used in this estimation were taken 
firstly, from the study directed by Robert Giffen and presented to the 
House of Commons in 1877 and 1881. The data were developed by the 
                                                 
16  The authors do not make explicit how many of these identical 16 categories are 
manufactures. Apparently they get a weighted manufacture tariff average dividing 
costumes revenues by imports on the total category for every country.  The estimation 
of the Unweighted tariff average is not possible under this procedure.  As elasticity of 
import demand of manufactures use to be quite high, weighted tariff average 
undervalued  the  manufacture tariff average of countries and years with higher tariffs.    
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 UK Statistical and Commercial Department Board of Trade, with the title: 
“Import Duties on British Goods (Foreign Countries) and Rates of Duty 
(Foreign and Colonial) on British Manufactures or Produce”.  Secondly, 
from the Annual Statement of Trade (1876) and Board of Trade (1878).  
The first work relates tariffs and prices imposed upon 15-24 manufactured 
articles in 32 countries. The second prices and duties for an additional 9 
manufactured articles obtained from a similar group of countries. This 
material provides us with a complete series of homogeneous data of the 
tariff average for around 26 industrial products  in 32 countries (for 
sources, products and technique used see Appendix).   
 A detailed work has been developed also for the classification of 
the mentioned manufacture tariffs in a raking according to their respective 
skill intensity. In the literature, relative skill intensity by sectors is 
estimated by using ratios of workers with more than 12 years of schooling 
over the total. To our knowledge, no data of this kind is available on the 
ratios of skilled workers in different industrial sectors at the end of the 19th 
century.17 Skill intensity measures, are apparently quite stable to 
temporal and geographical changes and we have made  the assump
that capital is uniformly distributed between sectors and in consequence 
that sectors with relatively higher salaries have a higher proportion of 
skilled workers.
tion 
sity.19  
                                                
18 This means that we assume that higher “median” wage 
sectors will rank higher in our estimations of skill inten
 
 
17 The oldest compelling available source is the UK census of 1951, which offers 
figures for skilled, semi-skilled and un-skilled blue-collar (male-female) and the number 
of white collar workers by sectors. See the recent paper by Beltran-Ferry&Pons (2007) 
which includes an estimation of skill intensity based on this data. 
18 This may produce errors in some circumstances because the temporal scarcity of 
some skills may offer high salaries independently of productivity. For this reason we 
prefer our broader measure of skill intensity represented by 75 Diff-Skill.  
19 Nunn and Trefler (2006) show how the use of alternative skill-intensity rankings at 
the same time as those of the USA (1972), South Africa (1997) and Brazil (1972) had 
no effect at all on the final results of their correlation coefficient between skill intensity 
and growth.  
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 Table 1 
    
 Skill intensity ranking   
Ranking Description skill intensity  
1  Ships   13,01  
2  Machinery hardware&c  12,65  
3  Paper Manufactures  11,65  
4  Silk thrown 11,58  
5  Iron Steel Manufactures  11,29  
6  Leather and Manufactures  11,00 high cut-off 
7  Copper lingots, Cakes, Slabs  10,01  
8  Alkali Chemical products   9,64  
9  Apparel  9,27  
10  Woollen & Worsted Manufactures  7,9 low cut off 
11  Linen Manufactures  7,8  
12  Cotton Manufactures  7,74  
13  Jute Canvas and Sacking  7,04  
14  Woollen yarns(stuffs all wool)    6,2  
15  Linen Yarn  5,9  
16  Cotton yarns undyed  5,8  
  
Sources: The wages used to construct this “skill intensity” ranking came from two different 
sources: the wage distribution for male production workers in 12 manufacturing industrial 
sectors in 1890 in Iowa (covering the 165 largest cities) offered by Claudia Goldin and 
Frank Katz (1996, Appendix Table 1, p.46); and the patchy but abundant information on 
wage distribution in the textile sector (cotton, wool, hemp, jute and silk) in Barcelona in 
1884 (included in Scheuch (1885)).  
 
The wages used to construct the skill intensity ranking showed in 
Table 1 came from two different sources (see sources at the bottom of 
the table). In the first case, the complete wage structure makes it possible 
to estimate the “median” wage of the sector. In the second one, extensive 
but incomplete information on wages for different textile sectors allows 
constructing incomplete professional samples by sector, but it suggests 
the use of a simple wage average instead of the “median” average for the 
estimation skill intensity ranking of the different textiles sectors.  
For the institutional variables, the level of democracy of a country,   
POLITY2 and the level of independence of the executive government, 
XCONST, the data came from the Polity IV data base. It contains coded 
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 annual information on regime and authority characteristics for all 
independent states (with a total population greater than 500,000) in the 
global state system and covers the years 1800-2004. 20  
 
 
5.  Evidence on Tariffs and Growth  
The recent paper mentioned above of Lehmann-O´Rourke (2008) 
use panel data exploiting the variation in agricultural and industrial tariffs 
for a sample of ten countries, most of them rich, in late 19th century. 
Attention is focused, on the association of manufacture and agricultural 
tariff structure with the ups and downs of economic activity of the rich 
countries.21 The work developed here pay a greater emphasis on 
manufacture tariff structure and long-run growth, of rich and poor 
countries according to the skill intensity structure of their manufacture 
sector. Therefore we have designed an extended and homogeneous ad 
valorem tariff data base for around 26 industrial products for 32 countries 
in 1875, and later we have assembled these data in 16 industrial sectors, 
ranked according to their relative skill intensity bias. This model, for the 
first time, privileges the industrial tariff structure, the geographical 
coverage of data, and the long-run relationship between tariffs and 
growth. In order to capture this effect, regional dummy fixed variables or 
different clubs of countries will be employed alternatively. The 
econometric strategy of this paper is to run a simple cross-section model 
with interaction terms and fixed regional effects in order to capture the 
income and regional influence in the association between tariffs and long-
                                                 
20 See description of variables in POLITY IV Proyect.  
21 This is clearly notice in Lehmann-O´Rourke (2008) conclusions of their paper  “By 
Focusing on five-year periods, in common with much of the empirical literature, we may 
have been picking up the short to medium run impact of protection, rather than the 
longer run effects” (p.14). 
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 run growth.22 Furthermore, an intuitive theoretical model of endogenous 
growth is provided which relates both sides of the equation.  We expect 
that, in general terms, most of the countries of our sample will impose 
high tariffs in industries that generate no positive externalities and slow 
growth.  In a cross section study like this, the reduced number of 
observations limit the simultaneous introduction of several control 
variables and explanatory variables altogether  in a single regression 
equation.  Average tariff (75NT), manufacture tariffs (75UNTMAN), 
structure of protection (75Diff Skill) may not be put in one regression 
because there is a high correlation between them. Only the initial GDP 
per capita (70GDPpc) and the variable that proxy good institutions 
(75XCONST) would be used, in the same regression, with the regional 
dummies, as control variables. 23  
 
                                                 
22 Cross sectional regression with initial measures of export of natural resources, 
openness, tariffs explaining long-run growth are common in this literature. See by 
instance well-known empirical growth studies, such as Sachs and Warner (1999), 
Edwards (1992, 1998) or Irwin (2002b).  
23 The explanation why not show one regression in which all variables are put in once 
is related with the high vicariate correlations coefficients between variables showed in 
Table 3 of the Appendix. Exception to this high correlation is the low coefficient showed 
between 75xConst and  75Diff-Skill.                     
 22
 Table 2
Tariff Structure and Economic Growth with Regional Fixed Effects 
Dependent Variable: Growth in real per capita GDP, 1870 to 1913
1 2 3 4 5
Initial per capita GDP -0.0004 -0.005 -0.005 -0.006 -0.005
         (70GDPpc) 0.005*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.005***
Initial Total Tariff Average -0.023
        (75 NT) 0.005***
Initial Manufacture Tariff Average -1.526
Unweighted (75 UNTMAN) 0.013**
Initial Tariff Skill Bias 2.033 2.039
       (75 Diff Skill) 0.002*** 0.003***
Goods Institutions 0.046 0.099
       (75XCONS) 0.225 0.013**
Dumy Abundant Land 0.663 0.621 0.574 0.575 0.356
       (DumLand) 0.008*** 0.006*** 0.008*** 0.010*** 0.119
Dumy Rich 0.542 0.727 0.684 0.723 0.674
       (DumRich) 0.039** 0.001*** 0.002*** 0.007*** 0.009***
Dumy Political Independence 0.793 0.848 0.954 0.83 0.479
0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.004*** 0.051*
Number observations 38 33 32 28 32
R2 0.558 0.626 0.671 0.675 0.503
R2 (Adjusted) 0.489 0.556 0.608 0.582 0.407
Note: P-values underlined 
Sources: Appendix Table 2
*** significant at 1%;  **Significant at 5%; *Significant at 10%
 
 
 
Table 2 tests the comparative explanatory power of the total tariff 
average, manufacture tariff and skill industrial tariff respectively for long-
run growth in 1870-1913.24 Variables are not logged and the respective 
regressions include three additional dummy variables with regional fixed 
effects related with the level of development, land abundance or political 
independence (with only two values 0 and 1, rich countries = 1, the rest = 
0; rich land abundant countries = 1, the rest = 0; political independent 
countries = 1, the rest = 0 ) following the discussion of previous sections 
about the importance of the level of development, factor endowment and 
                                                 
24 Basic variables and sources of Table 2 are defined and extensively commented in 
Appendix Table 2  and Section 4.   
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 political independent variables in the explanation of regional asymmetry 
found between tariffs and growth by the literature.  Regression 1 shows 
that these regional fixed effects, are relevant in the regressions between 
the tariff average and late 19th century growth.  The regional fixed effect 
dummies allow extending the explanatory power of the initial average 
tariff on growth from the small group of O’Rourke rich countries to a more 
representative world of 38 countries. Furthermore, the results would show 
that in a larger world, with rich and poor countries included in the sample, 
the sign of this relationship change from positive to negative. What is 
more important, as regression 2 shows, the countries which imposed 
higher tariffs to the manufacture sector were those that had the worst 
growth performance, and this relationship is stronger than showed by the 
total tariff average. Exploring further the association between 
manufacture tariffs and growth, regression 3 offers some evidence to 
support the idea that there are a positive relationship between the 
efficiency of the structure of manufacture protection and growth. The 
efficiency of the structure of protection in this work means higher tariffs in 
the more skill intensive manufacture sectors, and it is measured by the 
initial tariff skill bias (our variable 75Diff Skill). The coefficient of 
correlation between manufacture tariffs (75UNTMAN) and tariff skill bias 
(75Diff Skill) is very high and negative (-0.91), which does  not allow us to 
include both variables in the same regression, but would support the idea 
that those with higher manufacture tariffs were those with the most 
inefficient structure of manufacture protection. That would suggest too, 
that countries which apparently put more emphasis on an import 
substituting strategy, and imposed higher tariffs on manufacture sectors, 
were those that had a more inefficient manufacture tariff structure and a 
worse growth performance.  This evidence would fit with the initial 
hypothesis that more protected countries were more interested in barring 
foreign competitors than in promoting growth, which is consistent with the 
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suggestion that tariffs may be the outcome of a political rent-seeking 
game in which the quality of institutions may play an important role as a 
causal variable. Nevertheless we should decide between good tariff 
structure or good institutions, as the main responsible of the good growth 
performance, because of the potential endogenous connexion between 
both variables. Our interest is to find a direct connection between a good 
manufacture tariff structure and their potential positive externalities on the 
wide economy as main explanatory variable for growth.  Regression 5 in 
Table 2 shows, on one hand, the coefficient of “good institutions”, 
explained by a variable as the level of independence of the executive 
government (75XCONST), is very low but positive and significant. On the 
other hand, regression 4 offers a combination of both variables, good 
institutions and good tariff structure, in the same regression. The result 
shows that tariff structure and not institutions is the main variable 
explaining late 19th century growth,  which is consistent with the argument 
explained above.25 
 
25 That’s would be possible because the Coefficient of Correlation  between the skill 
bias (75diff Skill) and our measures of good institutions (75XCONST)  and (75POLT2) 
are very low around 0,20 and 0, 08 respectively. 
 Variables Variables 
Coeff. Prob.  Coeff. Prob.  Coeff. Prob.  Coeff. Prob.  
Constant 1.121 0.000 1.557 0.000*** Constant 1.182 0.000 1.824 0.000
Initial per capita GDP (70GDPpc) 0.000 0.948 0.000 0.265 Init ial per capita GDP (70GDPpc) 0.000 0.980 0.000 0.077*   
75NT*Dummy R1 - - 0.023 0.017** 75UNTMAN*Dummy R1 - - 0.008 0.001***
75NT*Dummy R2 - - 0.021 0.005*** 75UNTMAN*Dummy R2 - - 0.018 0.000***
75NT*Dummy R3 - - -0.024 0.042** 75UNTMAN*Dummy R3 - - -0.022 0.004***
75NT*Dummy R4 - - -0.100 0.020** 75UNTMAN*Dummy R4 - - -0.107 0.002***
75NT*Dummy rich (R1+R2) 0.024 0,035** - - 75UNTMAN*Dummy rich (R1+R2) 0.022 0,0698* - -
75NT*Dummy poor (R3+R4) -0.015 0,081* - - 75UNTMAN*Dummy poor (R3+R4) -0.012 0,018** - -
Number of Observations Number of Observations
Prob>F Prob>F
R-squared R-squared
Adj R-squared Adj R-squared
Variables Variables 
Coeff. Prob.  Coeff. Prob.  Coeff. Prob.  Coeff. Prob.  
Constant 1.039 0.000 1.151 0.000*** Constant 1.597 0.000 1.611 0.000
Initial per capita GDP (70GDPpc) 0.000 0.392 0.000 0.645 Init ial per capita GDP (70GDPpc) 0.000 0.314 0.000 0.332
75DIFF_SKILL*Dummy R1 - - -2.821 0.529 75DIFF_SKILL*Dummy R1 - - -2.213 0.603
75DIFF_SKILL*Dummy R2 - - -3.172 0.046** 75DIFF_SKILL*Dummy R2 - - -2.731 0.073*  
75DIFF_SKILL*Dummy R3 - - 1.556 0.035** 75DIFF_SKILL*Dummy R3 - - 2.269 0.003***
75DIFF_SKILL*Dummy R4 - - -16.408 0.188 75DIFF_SKILL*Dummy R4 - - -9.223 0.587
75DIFF_SKILL*Dummy rich (R1+R2) -3.259 0,039** - - 75DIFF_SKILL*Dummy rich (R1+R2) -2.710 0,063*   
75DIFF_SKILL*Dummy poor (R3+R4) 1.291 0,066* - - 75DIFF_SKILL*Dummy poor (R3+R4) 2.239 0,003*** - -
75POLT2 0.013 0.421 0.014 0.409
Number of Observations Number of Observations
Prob>F Prob>F
R-squared R-squared
Adj R-squared Adj R-squared
Dependent Variable: 1870-1913 GDP per capita GrowthDependent Variable: 1870-1913 GDP per capita Growth
Initial TotalTariffs and Growth Regressions with Interaction Terms
Table 3 Table 4
Initial Manufatures Unweighted Tariffs and Growth Regressions with Interaction Terms
0.00***
Eq. 1 Eq. 2
37
0.00***
37
Eq. 1 Eq. 2
33
0.00*** 0.00
33
Table 5
Initial Skill Bias Tariffs and Growth Regressions with Interaction Terms
Dependent Variable: 1870-1913 GDP per capita Growth Dependent Variable: 1870-1913 GDP per capita Growth
Initial Skill Bias Tariffs and Growth Regressions with Interaction Terms
Table 6
Eq. 1 Eq. 2
0.38 0.53
0.31 0.44
0.44
0.33
0.42
0.32
0.00 0.28
3232
0.00 0.015**
0.00 0.40 0.00 0.49
0.00 0.34
0.02**0.00***
28
Eq. 2Eq. 1
28
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 Tables 3 to 6 present a test to the regional asymmetry of the 
different explanatory variables used above (Total Tariffs, Manufacture 
Unweighted Tariffs, Skill-bias Tariff, and Good Institutions). The 
econometric strategy used in these tables was to introduce four different 
regional dummies, with interaction terms, for each of the respective 
independent variables. On one hand, in equation 2 we introduce our four 
different regional dummy variables: Dummy R1: Rich European 
Countries; Dummy R2: Rich New Settlers; Dummy R3: Poor Political 
Independent Countries and Dummy R4: Colonies and Protectorates.  On 
the other hand, in equation 1 we offer a regional division of the world 
between the “rich club” (Dummy Rich (R1+R2)) and the “poor club” 
(Dummy poor (R3+R4). As expected, following the main hypothesis of the 
paper, results show how the relationship between tariffs and growth is 
only slightly positive and significant for the rich country club and negative 
and strongly significant for the rest. This happened for total and for 
manufacture tariffs (NT and UNTMAN respectively) and in both 
equations. In equation 1, we present the word divided in two separate 
clubs according the level of development (Dummy rich (R1+R2) and 
Dummy poor (R3+R4), and in equation 2 the impact of every regional 
dummy. Results show a positive sign for the rich Europeans and Land 
abundant (Dummy R1 and Dummy R2) and negative sign for the poor 
Independent (Dummy R3) and for the poor Dependent Countries (Dummy 
R4) respectively.   Therefore, in line with previous findings,  Table 3 and 4  
show that the influence of  tariff average and tariff manufacture  on growth 
at the end of the 19th century was negative for the world globally, as table 
2 show, but that the impact was different for rich and poor countries. It 
would confirm that Bairoch and O’Rourke’s tariff-growth positive 
hypothesis apparently only works in the case of the rich countries club. 
 Despite a general positive correlation between the protection of 
skill-intensive sectors and growth applying to the entire sample, still 
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 regional asymmetry persists, as showed in Tables 5 and 6. Results in 
Table 2 fit with the general expectations that countries that protected the 
more skilled industrial sectors were those with the best growth 
performance. However, regional correlations introduced in equation 1 of 
Table 5 and 6, show that this mainly happened in the “poor country club”. 
To the contrary, rich countries appear to have a negative relationship 
between the efficiency of the structure of protection and growth 
performance, even if coefficients are significant only if the interval of 
confidence is reduced to 5 or even 10%. This appears to be as a 
paradox, as it means that, in the case of the rich countries, those that 
protected more the unskilled manufacture sectors, ended-up with better 
growth performance. However, at a deeper level of disaggregation, 
negative sign is only significant for the New Settlers land abundant 
countries (Dummy R2), but not for the rich European countries (Dummy 
R1). To explain this result one can consider that New Settlers economies 
may be outliers because their special factor endowment created the 
conditions to impose high tariffs for reasons involving public finance and 
political economy, as we discussed in the introduction. For these 
countries growth was exogenous to protection in general, while the 
structure of protection was oriented towards low-skilled sectors because 
their relative lower elasticity of demand led to maximisation of tax 
revenues.  
 
 
6. Conclusions 
The potential dynamic relationship between tariffs and growth can 
better be appreciated in the long run, and this paper highlights the 
importance of the structure of protection and regional asymmetry in this 
long term relationship. In theory, there is no reason to find a 
systematically unambiguous association between average tariffs and 
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 growth in different groups of countries, and regional asymmetry may be 
partially explained by different tariff structures.  
The paper’s main methodological innovation is the use of a new 
database of industrial tariffs for 32 countries in the 1870`s. This new 
evidence allows, by first time, to include manufacture protection and 
manufacture tariff structure as explanatory variables alongside tariff 
average, and different regional dummies. Results show that, at a global 
level, income, factor endowment, and political independence are 
important variables to explain regional asymmetry in the association 
between tariffs and growth. Under these conditions, an increase in 
protection, measured by total and manufacture tariff averages, implied 
more protection of un-skilled and inefficient sectors and less growth, and 
this is especially consistent with the behaviour of poor countries in the 
late 19th century.  Protection apparently was positive for the “rich country 
club”, but had a limited impact growth.  
Comparative advantage in low-skilled sectors might be an engine to 
growth, therefore higher protection of those sectors might appear as a 
legitimate option. However, international trade theory and historical 
experience show that tariffs never focus on relative low cost sectors with 
comparative advantage in the present. Tariffs in non comparative 
advantage sectors in the present may have a positive relationship with 
growth in the future, if high tariffs are imposed in sectors with dynamic 
positive externalities. Endogenous growth literature assumes that this 
might be the case if “good institutions” succeed in controlling rent-
seeking.  
In this paper tariff skill-bias runs through measures of good 
institutions, and reduces the possibility that the skill-bias of the protection 
structure is capturing the broader effect of “good institutions” on growth. 
In broader terms, this paper proves that the initial total and manufacture 
tariff negative relation with growth is related with the tariff structure, and 
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 shows how those that protected skill intensive sectors had a better growth 
performance than those who did not and this is specially true for the poor 
countries. Tariff structure provides a better causal mechanism 
explanation of the 1870-1913 growth than the initial tariff average, 
independently of income level. The paper also proves strong regional 
asymmetry behaviour of tariff on growth in the world between the rich and 
the poor.   
This works thus rejects the established view that, as a general 
statement, tariffs were positively associated with long-run growth in late 
19th century, as has been maintained recently by O’Rourke (2000), 
Williamson (2001, 2006a), Jacks (2006). European and Latin American 
peripheral countries demanded high tariffs to defend national industry 
from the competition of manufactured imports from rich countries. Tariff 
structure was the result of a rent seeking policy competition between 
inefficient sectors trying to defend national manufactures more than a 
governmental tariff import-substitution strategy. An inefficient manufacture 
tariff structure did not foster positive externalities at an economy wide 
level, and this was especially true for the developing world. That is 
probably the reason why total, and especially manufacture tariffs, usually 
appear associated with a negative growth in the world in late 19th century.  
Protection, in general, seems negatively correlated with growth, but 
had apparently a slight positive impact for the “rich country club”. This 
result, in strict sense, is consistent with Lehman-O’Rourke (2008) very 
recent paper, highlighting that manufacture tariffs were positively related 
with growth in the developed world late 19th century: “it could well be that 
what was true in our sample of more or less affluent economies was not 
true for poorer regions of the world as well” (p.13). Strong regional 
asymmetries suggest that the association between protection and growth 
depends on what was protected. This paper suggests that in late 19th 
century, as today, it is necessary not only to look at the different impacts 
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 of agricultural vs. industrial protection, but at the efficiency in the 
configuration of manufacture protection too. Much work is still to be done 
about the reasons of the different configurations of tariff structures, but 
also about the different impact of tariff policy in different economic 
context, to understand more about the dynamics mechanism of causality 
between tariffs and long-run growth.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 31
 Bibliographical References 
 
Antweiler, Werner & Trefler, Daniel (2002): “Increasing Returns and all 
that: A view from trade”. American Economic Review 92, nº1: 
pp.93-119. 
Bairoch, P. (1972): “Free trade and European Economic Development in 
the 19th Century” European Economic Review, nº3, pp.211-245.  
Bairoch, P., (1976): Commerce Exteriour et Development Economique de 
lÉurope au XIX siècle, Paris –Le Haye: Mouton. 
Bairoch, P., (1989): “European Trade Policy, 1815-1914”, in P. Mathias y 
S. Pollard, The Industrial Economies: The development of 
economic and Social policies, The Cambridge Economic History of 
Europe, vol. VIII, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press,pp.1-60. 
Bairoch, P., (1996): Economics and World History. Brighton: Havester 
Wheat sheaf. 
Betran, C., Ferri, J. & Pons, M.A (2007): “Wage Inequality and 
Globalisation: What can we learn from the Past? A General 
Equilibrium Approach” Documentos de Trabajo FUNCAS, Nº. 352. 
Board Of Trade (1905): “The Comparative Incidence of Foreign and 
Colonial Import Tariffs on the Principal Classes of Manufactures 
Exported from United Kingdom” British Parliamentary Papers, 
LXXXIV, 1905, pp.280-320. 
Bertola, Luis & Williamson, J (2006): "Globalization in Latin America 
Before 1940," in V. Bulmer-Thomas, J. Coatsworth and R. Cortés 
Conde (eds.), The Cambridge Economic History of Latin America: 
Vol.II. The long Twenty Century. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press. 
Clemens, M.A. & Williamson, J. G. (2001): “A Tariff Growth Paradox? 
Protection’s Impact the World Around 1875-1997”, NBER Working 
Paper Series 8459.  
 32
 Clemens, M.A. & Williamson, J. G. (2004): “Why did the tariff-growth 
correlation reverse after 1950? Journal of Economic Growth 9 (1), 
pp. 5-46. 
Coatsworth. J. & Williamson, G.  J (2004):  “Always Protectionist"? Latin 
American Tariffs from Independence to Great Depression,” Journal 
of Latin American Studies vol. 36, part 2 (May 2004), pp. 205-32.  
De Long, Bradford (1995): “Trade Policy and American Standard of 
Living. A Historical Perspective".Mimeo: Berkeley University 
California sixth Draft.  
De Jong, David. & Ripoll, M. (2006): Tariffs and Growth: An empirical 
Exploration of Contingent Relationships. Review of Economics and 
Statistics November 2006, Vol. 88, No. 4, pp. 625-640. 
Edwards, S. (1992): “Trade orientation, distortions and growth in 
developing countries.” Journal of Development Economics. 39, pp. 
31–57. 
Edwards, S. (1998): “Openness, Productivity and Growth: What do we 
really know?” Economic Journal, 108, March, pp.383-398. 
Federico, G. & Tena, A. (1991): "On the Accuracy of International Foreign 
Trade Statistics (1909-1935). Morgenstern revisited" (with G. 
Federico), Explorations in Economic History, vol. 28, nº 3, pp.259-
273.  
Federico, G. & Tena, A. (1998): “Was Italy a protectionist country?” 
European Review of Economic History, Vol. 2, n.1, pp.73-97. 
Federico, G. & Tena, A. (1999): “Did trade policy foster Italian 
industrialization. Evidences from the effective protection rates 
1870-1930”. Research in Economic History, Volume 19, pp.111-
138. 
Findlay, Robert &  O`Rourke, H. (2007): Power and Plenty. Trade, War, 
and the world Economy in the second Millennium. Princeton 
University Press. Princeton and Oxford. 
 33
 Goldin, Claudia & Katz, Laurece, F. (1999): “The Returns to Skill in the 
United States across the Twentieth Century.” NBER Working Paper 
series w.7126.  
Grossman, Gene M. & Helpman, Elhanan (1991): Innovation and Growth 
in the Global Economy, Cambridge, MA, MIT Press, 1991. 
Grossman, Gene M. & Helpman, Elhanan (1994): “Protection for Sale” 
American Economic Review, 84 (4), pp.833-850. 
Grossman, Gene M. & Helpman Elhanan (2001): Special Interest Politics 
Cambridge, M.A.: MIT Press.  
Irwin, Douglas A (1994): “Learning-by-Doing Spillovers in the 
Semiconductor Industry ,” (with Peter J. Klenow) Journal of Political 
Economy 102 (December 1994),  pp.1200-1227. 
Irwin, Douglas A (2001): “Tariffs and Growth in Late Nineteenth Century 
America” The World Economy, January 2001, 24, pp. 15-30. 
Irwin, Douglas A (2002a): “Did Import substitution promote growth in late 
Nineteenth Century” NBER working papers, W.8751, January. 
Irwin, Douglas A (2002b): Interpreting the Tariff-Growth Correlation in the 
Late Nineteenth Century. American Economic Review (Papers & 
Proceedings) 92 (May 2002), pp.165-169. 
Irwin, D. A. & Tervio, M. (2002c):  Does Trade raise Income? Evidence 
from the Twenty Century. Journal of International Economics, 58, 
pp.1-18. 
Jacks, David. S (2006): “New Results on the tariff-growth paradox” 
European Review of Economic History, 10, pp.205-230.  
Krueger, A. (1974):  "The Political Economy of the Rent Seeking Society," 
American Economic Review 64, (June), pp. 291-303. 
Krueger, A. (1997): “Trade Policy and Economic Development: How We 
Learn” American Economic Review, n.1, VOL.87, pp.1-22. 
League Of Nations (1927) Tariff Levels  Indices, Geneva, pp.1-38. 
Lehman, S.H & O´Rourke, K.S (2008): “The Structure of Protection and 
 34
 Growth in the Late 19th Century” National Bureau of Economic 
Research Working Papers 14493. 
Lewis, W. A. (1978): Growth and Fluctuations, 1870-1913 (Boston: Allen 
and Unwin). 
Liepman, H. (1938):  Tariff Levels and the Economic Unity of Europe, 
pp.1-424. 
Maddison, Angus (2001): The World Economy. A Millennial Perspective. 
Development Centre of the Organization for Economic Co-
operation and Development. Paris France. 
Magee, Christopher (2002): Endogenous trade policy and lobby 
formation: An application to the free rider problem. Journal of 
International Economics, 57 (2); pp. 449-471.  
Magee, Stephen; Brock, William, Young, Leslie (1989): Black hole tariffs 
and endogenous policy theory. Political economy in equilibrium. 
Cambridge University Press. New York. 
Milward, A. S. & Soul, S. B. (1977): The Developments of the Economies 
of Continental Europe, 1850-1914. London, George Allen and 
Unwind. 
Nunn Nathan and Trefler, Daniel (2006): “Putting the Lid on Lobbying: 
Tariff Structure and Long-Term Growth when Protection is for 
Sale”, NBER Working Paper 12164.  
O’Rourke, K. (1997.a): “The European Grain Invasion, 1870-1913” 
Journal of Economic History 57, pp. 775-801. 
O’Rourke, K. (2000): “Tariffs and Growth in the Late 19th Century” 
Economic Journal 110, April, pp. 456-483.  
O’Rourke, K. & Williamson, J. G. (1999): Globalization and History. 
Cambridge Massachusetts: MIT Press. 
O’Rourke, K. (2000): “Tariffs and Growth in the Late 19th Century” 
Economic Journal 110, April, pp. 456-483.  
POLITY IV Project.  Developed by Inter-University for Political and Social 
 35
 Research (ICPSR) and the University of Colorado and is housed at 
the Center for International Development and Conflict Management 
at the University of Maryland, College Park 
http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/polity/ 
Pollard, S (1982): Peaceful Conquest. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Rodriguez, Francisco & Rodrik Dani (2000): “Trade Policy and Economic 
Growth: A Sceptic’s Guide to the Cross-National Evidence.” NBER 
Macroeconomics Annual 15: 261-325. 
Rodrik, Dani & Subraniam, Arvind & Trebi, Francesco (2002): "Institutions 
Rule: The Primacy of Institutions Over Geography and Integration 
in Economic Development," CEPR Discussion Papers 3643, 
C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers 
Routh, Guy (1985): Occupation and Pay in Great Britain 1906-1979. 
London: Macmillan, First edition 1980. 
Sachs, Jeffrey D. & Andrew M. Warner (1999): "The Big Rush, Natural 
Resource Booms And Growth," Journal of Development 
Economics, 1999, v59, N.1, 43-76. Leading Issues in Economic 
Development, Oxford University Press, 2000. 
Scheuch, Fred H.S.  (1885): Labour in Europe, vol. 2 “A report from the 
US consul in Spain in 1885” 
Tena-Junguito, A. (1992): Las estadísticas históricas del comercio 
internacional (1890-1960): fiabilidad y comparabilidad, Madrid, 
Banco de España, Estudios de Historia Económica, nº 24. 
Tena-Junguito, A. (1999, 2006): “Un nuevo perfil del proteccionismo 
español durante la Restauración 1875-1930” Revista de Historia 
Económica, Año XVII, nº 3,  579-621. Translated  in “Spanish 
protectionism during the Restauración 1875-1930” en  Classical 
Trade Protectionism 1815-1914: Fortress Europe. Edited by Jean-
Pierre Dormois, Pedro Lains. London, New York. Routledge 
(Explorations in Economic History),  pp.265-297. 
 36
 Tena-Junguito, A. (2005): “The good reputation of late XIX century 
protectionism: manufacture versus total protection in the European 
tariff growth debate” Paper presented to the 6th Conference of  
EHES, Istanbul 9th September 2005. 
Tena-Junguito, A. (2006): “Assessing the protectionist intensity of tariffs in 
nineteenth-century European Trade policy” in Classical Trade 
Protectionism 1815-1914: Fortress Europe. Edited by Jean-Pierre 
Dormois, Pedro Lains. London, New York. Routledge (Explorations 
in Economic History), pp.99-120.  
Treffler, Daniel (1993): “Trade liberalization and the theory of 
Endogenous protection: An econometric study of US import policy. 
Journal of Political Economy 101 (1): pp.138-160. 
Williamson, J (2006a): “Explaining World Tariffs 1870-1938: Stolper-
Samuelson, Strategic Tariffs and State Revenues,” in R. Findlay, R. 
Henriksson, H. Lindgren and M. Lundahl (eds.), Eli F. Heckscher, 
International Trade, And Economic History (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT 
Press). 
Williamson, J (2006b): “Globalization, De-Industrialization and 
Underdevelopment in the Third World before the Modern Era” 
Revista de Historia Económica. Journal of Iberian and Latin 
American Economic History nº1, Primavera 2006. 
Vamvakidis, A. (2002): “How Robust is the growth-openness connection? 
Historical Evidence. Journal of Economic Growth 7, pp.57-80. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 37
 APPENDIX  
 
Estimation of the Industrial Tariff Data Base in 1875  
 
There is some well known contemporaneous estimation of 
comparative manufactures tariff averages by country before the First 
World War. The League of Nations (1927) offers comparative index 
numbers for more than a dozen of countries in 1913, but only Liepmann 
(1938) develops a complete disaggregated study by sector with an 
explicit methodology for the same year. Another relevant study, less 
commonly used by economic historians, is that of the Board of Trade 
(1905) which offers estimations of tariff averages in 20 countries for 32 
manufactured articles.  
For 1870`s, there is not a single systematic study,  so to develop 
the necessary quantitative variables on cross country industrial sector 
tariffs, a new panel of data has been constructed on the ad-valorem tariffs 
of 26 industrial articles in 1875 for 32 countries based on British sources. 
Following League of Nations  and Liepmann recommendations we offer 
both the Unweighted and the Weighted tariff average. For the first, it has 
been estimated a simple arithmetic average of the 26 industrial articles for 
every country, for the second, the relative importance of every article in 
total British exports is used as weight (See Colum 3 of Table 1 in this 
Appendix). This technique involves, in the first place, making a list of the 
principal classes of goods and assigning a rough “weight” to each group 
according to its comparative importance in British exports. A few leading 
articles or classes of articles are then chosen from each group as 
representative of the whole group, and the average tariff rates of duty on 
these leading articles for each country are taken as fairly representative 
of the tariff treatment of the whole group. These tariffs should be 
expressed using the standard British monetary, capacity, mass or weight 
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 units for the corresponding articles (for special calculations see the 
technical specifications below points (a), (b) and (c) in Table 1 of this 
Appendix). 
The sources present the incidence of import tariffs on the principal 
manufactures exported from United Kingdom (the main world 
manufacturer exporter in 1875) in more than 32 countries. This estimation 
uses British fob export prices instead of national cif import prices in the 
denominator for the estimation of the ad valorem tariffs. On the one hand, 
this would imply an over bias but in the case of manufactured articles with 
low freight factors, practical implementation of fob instead of cif prices 
makes little difference to the final results.26  On the other hand, especially 
for poor countries, British export values are closer to real market prices in 
frontier than the low accurate import unit values that most of the poor 
countries had in their respective official trade statistics in 1870.27   
 To obtain the sector tariff average the unweighted tariff of the 
articles belonging to the sector was used.  In this way, a complete series 
of homogeneous data of the tariff average for 14-16 industrial sectors in 
32 countries has been obtained (for the sectors see Table 1 of text, for 
the countries see Table 2, of this Appendix). This method (which is 
adopted below) has the advantage of applying a uniform standard to all 
countries, both as regards the list of articles on which the duties are 
calculated, and the relative “weight” attached to each article. The 
unweighted manufacture tariff by country assumes an artificial standard 
                                                 
26 The League of Nations (1927) used cif import and fob export prices for the estimation 
of total tariff average and concluded that “ the results obtained under the two systems 
are in fair accordance , but those from method B (fob export prices) tend to be slightly 
higher (on the average circa 8 per cent)”, p.6. In the case of the estimation of 
manufactures fob the accordance between the two systems is probably very close 
because manufacture freight factors are much lower than for primary products. 
27 For the accuracy of international foreign trade values see Federico- Tena (1991) and 
Tena (1992). 
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import demand structure for every country which has not been biased by 
tariffs.28   
 
Sources:  
 
Ad valorem rates, Import Duties and Prices of manufactures export in 1875: 
  
The data on prices were presented with the respective tariffs by the UK Statistical and 
Commercial Department Board of Trade, with the title: “Imports Duties on British Goods 
(Foreign Countries) and Rates of Duty (Foreign and Colonial) on British Manufactures 
or Produce”.  And also in  Import Duties on “British Goods (Foreign Countries) Return 
of the Estimated Average ad valorem Rate of Import Duty Levied in The Principal 
European Countries and in the United States, on certain Articles of British Produce or 
Manufacture” both in  British Parliamentary Papers vol. LXXVI.181. Session 1877. This 
study has been complemented with other estimations on prices especially for textiles 
(for instance Cotton Manufactures and Woollen and Worsted Manufactures) but also 
for an additional 9 manufactured articles for the year 1876, from the “Annual Statement 
of Trade: Return of the Values of the Exports of British and Irish Produce 1854-1880”.  
British Parliamentary Papers vol. LXV; Session 1882. 
With this material a complete series of additional homogeneous data of the tariff 
average for 16-14 industrial sectors in 32 countries has been obtained (for the final 
sector aggregation see Table 1 of Appendix 1). This study was directed by Robert 
Giffen and presented to the House of Commons in 1877 and 1881.  
 
Technical specification for some articles used for 1875,  
(a) In the same way as for cotton piece goods, for cotton yarns 40 yards to the lb 
has been assumed (see British Parliamentary Papers (1905), p.291,). 
(b) Cotton piece goods are entered in UK Trade Accounts by the yard whereas 
most duties are imposed by weight or graduated according to the weight per 
square metre of the tissues. An "average account" of 5 yards to the lb has been 
assumed. See British Parliamentary Papers (1905), p.291. 
(c) In the case of Woollen and Worsted Piece Goods average weights have been 
estimated varying from 18ozs to the yard for heavy broad woollen piece goods 
and worsted coatings to 5ozs to the yard for Mixed Worsted Stuffs. See British 
Parliamentary Papers (1905) p.291. 
(d) Equivalence for measurement of Mass or Weight: 1 Ton= 20CWT ; 1CWT= 
112Lb = 50,8Kg; 100yard  =  20Lb;1onz = 1/16 Lb; 1 lb= 0,453Kg. 
(e) Official equivalence for monetary units: 1 Pound = 20 shillings = 240d; 1 shilling 
= 12d. 
Database disposal to researchers under request.  
                                                 
28 The unweighted average was recommended by Loveday in his work on “tariff levels” 
for The League of Nations (1927) and was also supported by Liepmann (1938). The 
League of Nations (1927) estimated a tariff manufacture unweighted average using 
110 manufactured articles (excluding semi-manufactures).  Liepmann (1938) used the 
unweighted average of fob export prices for 144 products in which he used a separate 
index for semi-manufactures (44 articles) and manufactures (62 manufactured articles).  
 Table 1: Groups, Articles and Prices Taken as Representatives of British Manufacture Exports 1875 
Group Representative Articles Value of British Exports Average export 
  Of these groups of Values of these 
  Manufactures in 1876 Articles 1876 
  (Thousand Pounds)  
1 2 3 4
Cotton yarns (a)  12782  
 1. Cotton single unbleached  9d/Lb 
 2. Cotton single undyed  20d/Lb 
 3. Cotton double undyed  23d/Lb 
    
Cotton Manufactures (b)    
 4. Cotton piece bleached  31454 1988,08 d/Cwt (d) 
 5. Cotton piece printed  18494 2661,93 d/Cwt (d) 
    
Woollen &Worsted Yarn 6. Woollen and worsted yarn undyed 4417 60d/Lb 
    
Woollen&Worsted 
Manufacture© 7. Woollen stuffs all wool  18603 4594,35d/Cw (d) 
    
Linen Yarn (Lbs)  1450  
 8.  Linen yarns unbleached   20d/Lb 
 9.  Linen yarns single  26d/Lb 
 10. Linen yarns double  46d/Lb 
    
Silk (Thrown) 11. Silk Thrown 1081 800d/Lb 
    
Jute Manufactures    
 12. Jute Canvas and Sacking  1212 4d/Lb 
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Iron and Steel Manufactures    
 13. Pig Iron  2842 1200d/Ton 
 14. Bars &Angle 17382 1680d/Ton 
 15. Rails including steel rails 10225 1680d/Ton 
    
Machinery Hardware &c    
 16. Textile Machinery (l/Ton) 1383.059 2,45 lb/Cwt 
 17. Locomotive Machinery  (l/Ton) 556.058 2,25lb/Cwt 
 18. Sewing Machinery  (l/Ton) 518.329 6,75lb/Cwt 
    
Copper Manufactures    
 19. Copper lingots, Cakes, Slabs 983 19200d/Ton 
    
Leather and related Manufactures  2945  
 20. Ox & Cow Hides  26d/lb 
 21. Calf Skins  46d/lb 
    
Alkali Chemical products   2223  
 22. Bicarbonate Soda  228d/Cwt 
 23. Soda caustic  280d/Cwt 
 24. Crystals of Soda  82d/Cwt 
    
Paper Manufactures  1020  
 25. Paper for writing  6d/Lb 
 26. Paper for printing  4d/Lb 
           Table 2       
 Variables and data used in the tariff –growth regressions 
COUNTRY 75NT 70GDPpc 7013GDPGR 75NTMAN 75UNTMAN 75Dif Skil 75Corr Skill 75POLT2 75XCONS 75INST DumLand DumRich DumInd DumReg
AU 4.3 1862.6 1.45 21.6 14.1 -0.03 -0.08 -4.00 3.00 -0.50 0 1 1 1
BEL 1.5 2691.5 1.05 8.2 5.8 -0.04 -0.36 6.00 7.00 6.50 0 1 1 1
DEN 12.3 2003.2 1.57 14.9 9.9 -0.05 -0.14 -3.00 3.00 0.00 0 1 1 1
FRA 3.8 1875.7 1.45 21.3 15.1 -0.07 -0.23 7.00 7.00 7.00 0 1 1 1
GER 3.7 1839.1 1.61 13.1 8.7 -0.07 -0.25 -4.00 3.00 -0.50 0 1 1 1
NET 6.0 2756.8 0.90 2.0 1.3 -0.01 -0.10 -3.00 6.00 1.50 0 1 1 1
SWI 3.6 2102.1 1.66 3.1 4.5 0.00 0.10 10.00 7.00 8.50 0 1 1 1
UK 6.7 3190.4 1.01 1.0 1.0 3.00 7.00 5.00 0 1 1 1
AR 22.8 1310.6 2.50 17.3 18.5 -0.13 -0.40 -3.00 3.00 0.00 1 1 1 2
AUS 9.7 3273.2 1.06 6.5 6.0 0.03 0.24 10.00 7.00 8.50 1 1 1 2
CAN 12.8 1694.5 2.27 9.8 11.7 -0.03 -0.17 4.00 7.00 5.50 1 1 1 2
NEW 11.7 3099.7 1.19 5.7 6.7 -0.05 -0.68 10.00 7.00 8.50 1 1 1 2
USA 38.5 2444.6 1.82 61.1 52.0 -0.30 -0.60 10.00 7.00 8.50 1 1 1 2
URU 22.8 2180.8 0.98 0.0 0.0 -3.00 1.00 -1.00 1 1 1 2
GRE 14.0 880.0 1.39 10.8 12.6 -0.09 -0.51 9.00 7.00 8.00 0 0 1 3
HUN 4.3 1091.6 1.53 21.6 14.1 -0.03 -0.08 -4.00 3.00 -0.50 0 0 1 3
ITA 7.9 1499.4 1.26 15.4 10.2 -0.02 -0.14 -4.00 3.00 -0.50 0 0 1 3
NOR 11.6 1432.3 1.30 11.0 5.4 -0.08 -0.33 -4.00 5.00 0.50 0 0 1 3
POR 28.6 975.0 0.58 30.5 36.4 -0.33 -0.53 -7.00 3.00 -2.00 0 0 1 3
ROM 7.9 931.0 1.47 4.5 7.0 0.04 0.34 -7.00 3.00 -2.00 0 0 1 3
RUS 12.9 943.3 1.06 63.0 40.1 -0.18 -0.19 -10.00 1.00 -4.50 0 0 1 3
SPA 15.0 1207.1 1.25 50.2 34.5 -0.19 -0.46 -1.00 7.00 3.00 0 0 1 3
SWE 10.6 1661.5 1.46 14.9 9.1 -0.07 -0.30 -4.00 5.00 0.50 0 0 1 3
SER 2.8 599.0 1.33 0.0 0.0 0 0 1 3
BRA 34.6 713.0 0.30 36.7 33.6 -0.26 -0.70 -6.00 1.00 -2.50 0 0 1 3
CUB 25.0 1568.0 0.51 56.8 36.7 -0.38 -0.39 3.00 3.00 3.00 0 0 1 3
PER 37.9 749.0 0.20 24.7 37.3 -0.35 -0.65 -1.00 3.00 1.00 0 0 1 3
COL 28.3 749.0 1.17 29.1 40.8 -0.38 -0.69 -3.00 3.00 0.00 0 0 1 3
SOU 857.9 1.46 8.1 9.0 0.00 -0.51 4.00 7.00 5.50 0 0 0 4
IND 3.0 533.1 0.54 2.7 2.8 0.02 0.36 0 0 0 4
JAP 8.3 737.4 1.48 0.0 0.0 1.00 7.00 4.00 0 0 0 4
TUR 7.4 825.0 0.90 7.7 6.3 -0.02 -0.49 -10.00 1.00 -4.50 0 0 0 4
PHI 7.8 776.0 0.71 0.0 0.0 0 0 0 4
JAM 535.1 0.30 10.3 12.5 0.00 -0.20 0 0 0 4
THA 3.0 712.0 0.39 0 0 0 4
BUR 3.6 503.9 0.72 0 0 0 4
CEY 6.0 851.4 0.87 4.1 3.9 0.02 0.21 0 0 0 4
CHI 3.3 530.0 0.10 -6.00 1.00 -2.50 0 0 0 4
EGY 7.4 648.7 0.77 0 0 0 4
INDO 4.9 654.5 0.75 0 0 0 4
MAR 563.0 0.54 5.7 9.2 0.02 -0.04 -6 1 0 0 0 4
TUN 632.7 0.78 4.6 7.3 0.01 -0.04 0 0 0 4  
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     Recognition of Variables used in Table 2 
75NT Tariff Average of the 12 years thas go from 1865 to 1875 most of them from Clements-Williamson  Data base  
70GDPpc Maddison (2003) 1870  Real Per Capita Gross Domestic Product. 
7013GDPGR Acumulated rate of growth between 1870 and 1913.
75NTMAN Weighted Industrial Tariff of 1875, using total manufacture British export shares from Data Base Appendix 2.
75UNTMAN Unweigted Industrial Tariff Average from Data Base Appendix 2
75Dif Skil 75 Diff-Skill” is calculated as the difference between the  simple average of the ad valorem tariffs of the 
respective skill-intensive sectors (“up cut-off”) and the non skill-intensive sectors (“down cut off”) by country
75Corr Skill 75Corr-Skill”, a correlation between skill and tariff rankings of the industrial sector by country
75POLT2 POLITY2  (numeric) Range = -10 to 10 (-10 = high autocracy; 10 = high democracy) in 1875
75XCONS XCONST (numeric): Executive Constraints: operational (de facto) independence of chief executive in 1875
75INST An average of  75XPOL2 and 75XCONS
DumLand Dummy Land: Rich New Settlers = 1; the others = 0;
DumRich Dummy Rich: countries with GDP per capita bigger than half UK in 1870 =1; the others=0. 
DumInd Dummy Independence: Countries with Independent Comercial Policy=1; the others=0
DumReg Dummy Regions: Rich Europe=1; Rich Land Abundant=2; Poor Independent Countries=3; Poor Dependent Countries=4.  
 
Method and sources: see section 4 of the text  and Appendix 
“ESTIMATION OF THE INDUSTRIAL TARIFF DATA BASE IN 1875”  
 
 
 
Table  3 
Matrix Correlation Between Variables of Table 2
75DIFfSKILL 75NT 75UNTMAN 75XCONS
75DIFfSKILL 1.00 -0.87 -0.91 0.23
75NT -0.87 1.00 0.84 -0.23
75UNTMAN -0.91 0.84 1.00 -0.27
75XCONS 0.23 -0.23 -0.27 1.00  
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